Compare the US sub-prime market with the UK’s. The differences are so wide, you could drive a coaches and horses between them. But, then again, on further analysis, maybe the similarities are not so great after all.
You don’t need to be smart to understand the fundamental reason for the US crisis. The rate of interest rose from one percent to 5.25 percent in two years. Mortgages were offered to people on a two or three year fixed deal, at a rock bottom rate. But when this ended, the borrower had to pay the market rate. To rub salt into the wound, for many, this was now five times higher than the level when they took out the loan.
In the UK, by contrast, rates have merely risen from a low of 3.5 percent to the 5.25 percent we have today.
Besides, in the US, the rate of interest was one percent for 30 months, in the UK rates were less than four percent for just nine months
There are further differences too. In the US, evidence suggests that brokers were, how can we put it, extremely enthusiastic in selling the loans. It’s been suggested applicants were encouraged to lie about their income. Perhaps we can do no better than give an idea of how extreme the US sub-prime market had become by describing a loan known as ‘negative amortisation mortgage’. It’s a grand phrase to describe a reckless offer. For this type of loan, made available in the US recently, the initial payments didn’t even cover the interest on the debt. No wonder, when this initial, introductory period came to an end, crisis descended like a brick from the sky.
According to Capital Economics, at peak, 29 percent of all US mortgages were for at least 100 percent of the value of the property being mortgaged.
So it really does seem as if the US sub-prime crisis was a disaster in waiting.
It seems that another problem in the US is this: many sub-prime borrowers thought that if they ran into difficulties when their introductory period ended, then they could simply take out a new mortgage, with a new introductory offer. Apparently, penalty charges are not so high in the US, , and there was no contractual reason to stop this. But, or so says Capital Economics, house prices fell in value, and so the alternative mortgage offer was no longer available. The sub-prime crisis it appears, is in part down to the US experiencing that curse of early ’90s Britain, negative equity.
In the UK, of course, we have been through it. Unlike in the US, the UK market suffered from a major crash back in the early ’90s. This has created an environment of more ‘responsible lending.’
In the UK, for example, 100 percent mortgages are unusual.
Sub-prime lending in the UK is much smaller than the US in percentage terms. At peak, it is thought US sub-prime lending hit 25 percent of total mortgages, whereas in the UK, last year, it was nearer eight percent - or so Capital Economics has estimated.
Furthermore, if the value of a mortgage is high relative to the value of a property in the UK, then the lender looks for a lower loan to income ratio. This approach was not adopted in the US.
But, just because there are differences, it does not mean the UK is completely immune from potential disaster.
For one thing, while sub-prime lending is much lower in the UK, it has nevertheless doubled in the last three years.
But perhaps there are two more serious dangers.
Firstly, sure, mortgages to value are much lower in the UK than in the US. But in the UK, average house prices relative to disposable income are much higher. Capital Economics put it this way: “In particular, there has been a sharp rise in the size of mortgage advances relative to incomes. When we compare the ratio of house prices to average disposable incomes per employee in the UK and US, the relaxation in credit conditions on this measure has been far greater in the UK than in the US.”
You also need to bear in mind that the UK has enjoyed years of uninterrupted economic growth. But the good times cannot last forever, and only time will tell how the UK market will respond to an economic downturn.
Capital Economics said: “Simply because the potential fault lines in the UK mortgage market are different from those which helped trigger the US crisis does not mean that the UK is immune from future problems. Although we are happy to accept that lower interest rates can justify much of the recent rise in UK lending multiples, these more relaxed lending criteria have emerged against a very benign economic backdrop. Sooner or later, however, the economy will face more testing conditions. And, with the benefit of hindsight, it may well turn out that the growth in mortgage credit has run too far.”
But if there is one lesson, above all others that should be learnt from the US sub-prime crisis it is this: the fundamental reason for the US crisis was the move away from long term fixed rate deals, to variable rates with short term fixed introductory offers. In other words, the US adopted the UK model.
The British government wants the UK to adopt the previous US model, or long term fixed loans. Such a model would take the swings out of the market and create greater stability. It would enable the Bank of England to play with the rate of interest to get monetary policy right, without risking misery for home-owners. Above all, the US experience shows how dangerous variable mortgages are.
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