In the US, could the unthinkable happen? Could the Detroit Three, GM, Ford and Chrysler, really go bust? It would of course be a complete disaster, and Barack Obama is having none of it. He wants to see state subsidies, and in the UK unions are hoping that’s what happens.
Meanwhile the price of oil fell to its lowest level in 18 months, and that’s good news, right?
In any case, what has falling oil got to do with a US state-backed rescue of the Detroit Three?
The answer is this. Quite a lot actually, and it all boils down to when it is appropriate to subsidise business.
Reverse the two arguments seen above; maybe oil is now too cheap, maybe it is actually bad news it has fallen so far. As for the bail out of the Detroit Three, it seems that if you look at this from another point of view, then actually the bail out would be a complete disaster. Instead, governments on both sides of the Atlantic should use their borrowed money to subsidise a far more important industry than car manufacturing. Instead, we should see the subsidy of tomorrow’s industry, not yesterday’s.
This is the account of why and how.
Isn’t it annoying when people say: told you so? Well, oil fell below $60 yesterday, for the first time in 18 months, and we told you so.
Right now, everyone can see why oil is falling, but it wasn’t like that in the summer, when black gold was being priced at over $140. Back in August, Professor Paul Stevens, former Professor of Petroleum Policy at the CEPMLP Dundee University, said the price of oil could hit $200 within the next five to ten years. He said that only a collapse in the demand for oil could stop this from happening. But readers of this newsletter will hopefully recall the predictions made here many times throughout this year that “oil will be back below $70 soon.”
Mind you, the speed with which oil has fallen is a surprise – oil is another one of those indicators that has fallen off the edge of a cliff recently, falling from approaching $150, to less than $60 in just five months.
The reason is simple enough. When the economy is booming, oil goes up in price, until it eventually hits a level where it’s just plain unaffordable, then it crashes. The affordability this brings provides the catalyst for the economic recovery, and the cycle begins again. It is the stuff the economic cycle is made of. The economic cycle mirrors the natural cycle, too.
But there is a fear associated with the collapsing oil price. Inevitably we will see less investment as a result, and inevitably, when the global economic recession ends and it is all boom, boom again, there won’t be enough oil to meet demand, and price will soar. Professor Stevens may well be right, the black stuff may not hit $200 within five years, the economic downturn is too severe for that, but it will probably pass that level within ten years.
Now, if you sign up to the view that the terror of climate change is the single most serious threat to 21st century global stability, then all of a sudden the picture looks different.
If oil stays below $60 for any length of time – and, by the way, it fell to $10 in the last oil cycle – then renewable energy ceases to be attractive. Frankly, even when oil is at $140, the economic case for renewables is iffy.
And that brings this tale around to the case for subsides, the Detroit Three, and whether the state should use its money so we can live in the past, or look to the future.
There is more to the collapse of GM and Co. than a global economic downturn. Even when all was hunky dory with the economy, there was plenty of speculation that the three companies would not survive.
They are in fact cursed with many challenges – their failure to call the way the market was moving away from big thirsty monsters of the highway to nifty little Toyotas and Honda’s was more than just a mistake, it was a complete failure to see what was staring the companies in their eyes. The writing had been on the wall for years, and the big US car makers ignored it. If the US was addicted to oil, they were like the dealers who fed that habit.
The car giants are also struggling with a legacy of union intransigence, and pension commitment that just can’t be met. In this age when the likes of Google encourage staff to have fun, the Detroit Three are left with management practices that look increasingly like something out of the dark age. Their rival’s management approach is positively enlightened in comparison.
Bankruptcy is something that happens when companies mess up – it is the mechanism by which change occurs. In the vacuum that is left by the collapse of these companies, new opportunities will emerge. The Big Three will themselves use Chapter 11 rules to trade forward, but this will give the companies the opportunity to wipe the slate clean, and emerge lean, dynamic and forward thinking in the modern world.
Contrast this with the case for subsidising renewable energy. And to understand the difference, ponder for a moment the Sony PlayStation 3. When this product was first announced, techies worked out that component cost alone came to over $700. It will never be commercially viable, they said. But as the product sold, the component cost came down, and down again. For the games console business, it is a familiar story. As the market for a console expands, price falls.
It is all down to specializing – the true building blocks of economic prosperity. Adam Smith was the first to articulate this. In his 1776 book The Wealth of Nations, he famously talked about a pin factory, explaining how without specialization, each pin manufactured would have been many times more expensive.
It works like that with renewables, too. Recently, the Economist told how, according to Victor Abata, General Electric’s vice-president, in 2002, GE’s wind turbines were out of commission for 15 per cent of the time; now it is more like 3 per cent of the time.
In other words, the more we do, the better we get at doing it.
But before we can benefit from the price falls that occur with specialization, we need to get to a certain critical mass. And if oil starts selling for $60 or less, renewable energy will look too expensive, and will never gain momentum.
Subsidising car makers that have had the best part of one hundred years to hone their craft, is a backward step – analogous to the policy errors in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s which left the country with a bloated, inefficient manufacturing sector, that could not exist without subsidies.
Subsidies in new forms of energy are an investment in the future – the long-term implications will be cheaper energy and a cleaner planet. The short-term implications will be job creation.





