Risk is dead, long live risk

The world’s largest economy got off to an awful start.      The first-ever English colony in North America, Roanoke Colony on Roanoke Island failed in the most spectacular fashion.  It was founded in 1587 by 100 men and women in a venture fronted by Sir Walter Raleigh.  A few years later the colony was gone – no one knows why, or what happened to the intrepid explorers and extraordinary risk takers who gave their lives to the mission.  The country we know today as the United States of America was built upon this failure.    But in a way, things have not changed.  According to Paul Ormerod in his book, Why Most Things Fail, “more than 10 per cent of all economically active firms in the US go extinct within a year.” 

Risk taking is endemic to the US – maybe it is what makes the country the success it is, but on the other hand, maybe risk taking has become far too great.

As was told here yesterday, it appears there is just a chance that the credit crunch has passed the halfway mark.  Now is perhaps the time to contemplate our navels, and reason what really caused it and how a similar crisis can be avoided in the future?

Yesterday, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research claimed that one factor that may have helped create the finance crisis was a too relaxed attitude to failure.

As was told here on Tuesday, the high profile buy-to-let investment seminar group Inside Track went into administration this week.  Well, apparently, one of its founders ran a pyramid selling company which went bust in the 1980s – and NIESR seems to think this is significant, and yesterday drew attention to the 2002 Enterprises Act which was introduced to remove the stigma from honest failure and facilitate serial entrepreneurship.     

But many have argued this act has backfired, and has made the penalties for bankruptcy too lax – a factor, some say, that lies behind the recent surge in insolvency levels.

NIESR then turned its attention to the US, where bankruptcy laws are, or so it says, extremely lax.  US bankrupts can keep a minimum $125,000 housing equity – for example.

Maybe the fast and loose approach the US took to failure was a big factor behind the credit crunch.  NIESR says, for example, “International co-ordination of bankruptcy law is needed and laws need to be changed in countries like the US with poor practices which encourage excessive risk.”

NIESR is run by some extremely clever economists. Its Director Martin Weale is deservedly one of the most respected economists in the land, and there is no doubt that laws relating to entrepreneurism are important.   But are the laws really too lax?

In the US, entrepreneurs are often hailed as heroes – and those first settlers from Roanoke Colony were the first.

And now, follow Raleigh and the later colonists on board the Mayflower, mentally travel the Atlantic and consider this argument put forward by Newsweek economics editor Stefan Theil. 

“Just as schools teach a historical narrative, they also pass on “truths” about capitalism, the welfare state, and other economic principles that a society considers self-evident. In both France and Germany, for instance, schools have helped ingrain a serious aversion to capitalism. In one 2005 poll, just 36 per cent of French citizens said they supported the free-enterprise system, the only one of 22 countries polled that showed minority support for this cornerstone of global commerce. In Germany, meanwhile, support for socialist ideals is running at all-time highs—47 per cent in 2007 versus 36 per cent in 1991.”

Mr Theil was contrasting US with European attitudes to entrepreneurism.  He has argued that the likes of Brin and Page –that’s the Google boys, and Bill Gates are held up as heroes in the US.     Steve Jobs walks on water, and Warren Buffett has a halo that shines so bright you would need very dark glasses if you should ever visit Omaha.

And here is a question for you to ponder.  Who was the greatest economist of the 20th century? Well that is an easy one – Keynes of course.   Well, maybe, but some would argue that actually that epitaph should belong to someone else, an Austrian, seldom talked about in the UK, but revered by many in the US - Joseph Schumpeter

Joseph Schumpeter was a colourful character.  He once said he had three goals in life, to become the greatest lover in Vienna, the greatest horseman in Europe and the greatest economist in the world.  Modesty, it appears, was not his strong suit – but many believe that his third ambition at least was realised.

And what was the idea that made him famous – or at least famous in some quarters?

Schumpeter coined the phrase “gales of creative destruction”.   For him, entrepreneurs were the heroes, and failure an essential ingredient.

What is interesting about Schumpeter is that while his name is often splattered over economics books written by Americans, Alan Greenspan for example waxed lyrical about him in his book The Age of Turbulence, his name is not mentioned much in the UK – probably not much in Europe either – with the possible exception, presumably, of Austria.

There is also something inevitable about failure.  At the beginning of the last century, the economist Alfred Marshall drew up a list of the top 100 companies.     Mr Marshall was no mean economist, he wrote perhaps the first-ever textbook on the subject that was commonly quoted, and he counted among his pupils John Maynard Keynes.

So large and powerful were the companies on Marshall’s list, he argued that they would probably survive  indefinitely.    He referred to them as the Californian Redwoods – trees that can live for so long that to us humans, with our short life-span, they practically appear immortal.  Redwoods have in fact been known to live for over 2,000 years.

But in 1999, the economist L Hannah revisited the Marshall list, and discovered that of the 100 largest firms in 1912, 29 had, by the time of the study, gone bankrupt, 48 had disappeared, and just 19 of them were still in the US top 100.

Failure then is both inevitable and essential.

It is something we all understand intuitively.  Robert W Johnson, founder of Johnson and Johnson once said, “Failure is our most important product,” meaning the company had to experiment and take risk in order to move forward.

Sometimes large companies can internalise failure – in the way that Robert Johnson described.    Other times, companies behave like venture capital firms, and sit on the wings letting others innovate, and then just swooping and buying the successes – for example the giant drug companies, and now, increasingly, media companies like Microsoft, Google and News Corp. 

But innovation is not certain.  We just don’t know in advance what will work, and what will fail.

Economists might think of business leaders as being like a ship’s captain, standing on the bridge, hands on the ship’s wheel,  staring ahead looking for icebergs.    But as professor Donald Sull, an expert of business strategy, once said, it would be more appropriate to draw an analogy with a racing driver – making split second decisions.

The truth is that for entrepreneurs, the life-blood of future growth – failure is an ever present risk.

This is not understood.    The likes of Gordon Brown try to reform the tax system in order to encourage entrepreneurism, but miss the point.

Entrepreneurs are not put off starting their own ventures because they worry that they may have to pay too much capital gains tax, or because corporation tax is too high.    They are far more concerned about how they will survive, and their big fear is failure.

If you have two individuals who over a ten-year period earn exactly the same amount of money, but one has a steady job, and the other is an entrepreneur who has built up a business from scratch – who do you think pays the most tax?

The answer, almost certainly the entrepreneur, because his or her wage fluctuates each year.  Some years, hardly anything will be earned and the entrepreneur may not even use up all the personal allowances.  Maybe on another occasion, almost 50 per cent of all the money earned over those ten years is earned in one year – nearly all income in that year will prompt income tax at 40 per cent.

In the UK,  attitudes to entrepreneurism are too critical.  Bankruptcy carries massive social stigma costs, leaving many just too scared to contemplate entrepreneurship.

There is a danger that the backlash against banks and their excessive risk taking will hit entrepreneurs.  That is surely the single biggest danger to emerge  from the credit crunch.

The true reason for the credit crisis was that the US caught an English disease – the belief that house prices only ever go up; this is what caused excessive risk taking.  In Britain, would-be entrepreneurs opted instead for the safe route of buy-to-let investing.  We gave the US the fool’s faith in bricks and mortar – the US has far more to offer us – belief in the individual’s ability to innovate, and encouragement. If only the stigma of failure could be removed.

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King vents his wrath on the banks

All change please.

Not so long ago, banks were dynamic places of high risk but high reward. 

Shareholders liked their banks when they were full of “innovative, exciting activities.”  Those which adopted a more cautious approach were “often pilloried for being boring.”  Who said so, why none other than Mervyn King, yesterday, when addressing the Treasury Select Committee.

But banks were basing their decisions on “very poor assumptions.”   He said, “Banks have come to realise they are paying the price for having designed compensation packages that provide incentives that are not in the long-run interests of the banks themselves.” “We must make sure it doesn’t happen again,” Mr King added.
 
“I think all of us – and I do not exclude the Bank in this – have learnt a lot of lessons from the last nine months.”

It’s been hailed as an attack on too much risk taking by the banks.

But actually, the real problem was not too much risk taking at all.  Progress, especially technical progress, needs risk taking.  Without apparently reckless risk taking, maybe we would never have left the trees.  Without the billions spent on defence in the last century, technical progress would have been held back. 

The real problem was short-termism – rewarding bankers for decisions based on short-term performance, and too much emphasis on lending to the wrong areas.

Banks were reckless with their lending to homeowners and property investors – because they failed to grasp that just because a loan is backed by property, it does not mean it is secure.

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Bush fires the big gun and says cheque is in the post

Later this week when Mr and Mrs America get home from work there will be a nice surprise sitting on the doorstep: a nice big juicy cheque for $1,200 for them to spend as they like, courtesy of the US government.   This is the big one, all the other measures taken up to now, in comparison, are child’s play.  It’s a big gamble, sure, but in trying to boost the economy this way, George Dubya and his advisers are doing exactly what Keynes would have recommended. 

It’s a shame of course that the British government can’t do the same thing – because if there was one thing that could kick some life into the UK economy right now it would be a massive, one-off, pay day for all households.  But you know the reasons why they say the trick can’t be repeated over here.

But this begs the question: will the big tax credit do the trick?   The answer to that is important, because it has implications far beyond the US.

Actually, there won’t really be a cheque waiting on the doorstep – the money is being transferred electronically.   Furthermore, a mere 7 million rebates will be leaving the government’s bank account.  The rest of the 117 million households will have to wait a little longer. May 9 is the day marked on the calendar for the cheques to start going out, and at that point it really will be a case of sending the cheque in the post, so let’s hope the White House has got lots of self-adhesive envelopes and stamps, otherwise George Dubya will soon run out of spit.

Individuals will be getting $600, and couples $1,200, in a move that will set the government back around $160 billion. In the long run, of course, taxpayers will be paying for the credit, so in effect the government has decided that all taxpayers are to borrow against future earnings.

But the move does have one important feature.  The tax credit is not dependent on earnings.   In that sense it is like the complete opposite of the tax that brought Mrs Thatcher’s reign to an end – the poll tax.  But this is a poll credit.

So actually, although the US taxpayer will be no better off in the longer-term, the rebate will have created a massive re-distribution effect – so in a way, George Dubya  has taken on something of a Robin Hood persona.

But, then again, it is what Keynes would have diagnosed.   His reasoning went like this: when debt is high, cutting interest rates is not the way to get the economy moving.  Or to put it another way, you can’t solve a problem of too much debt, by getting people to borrow more.  It would be akin to “pushing on string,” said Keynes.     Instead, he said the answer was to hand out more money to people who tended to have a higher spending to saving ratio – the poor.    Get more money to the poorer folks, and they will spend it – and the economy’s lifeblood will start flowing again.  Give money to the rich, on the other hand, and they are more likely to save it.

That, though, is a problem this time round, because the poor US households, struggling with their sub-prime mortgages, are, on this occasion, also quite likely to save the money.

And therein lies the big doubt with the move.  Many economists fear that the majority of the money being handed out won’t be spent at all, rather it will be saved – or used to repay debt – and have a negligible effect upon the US economy 2008.

In fact, if the famous Sheriff of Nottingham from King John’s time was still alive today, and was now practising as an economist, he might even have advocated giving more of the rebate to the rich.

But actually, even if all the money was saved, rather than spent, it would be no bad thing in the long-term.  Just like the banks, US households need to shore up their balance sheets. 

US and UK banks  might not be passing the new money handed to them by central banks on to customers in the form of lower interest charges – but they are repairing their damaged balance sheet. 

That’s why neither the big US tax credit, nor the efforts by the Fed and Bank of England to resuscitate the money markets, may be enough to save the economy in 2008, but they should be enough to bring forward the eventual recovery.

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The global fix

So, it’s out.

The Bank of England had been going on about moral hazard and how you can’t reward failure.    The RBS had repeatedly said it did not need to raise more to fund its purchase of ABN Amro.   As for the rest of the banks, they were keeping mum.

But now the first two dominos are down.    There’s £50bn here from the Bank of England, £10bn, or so rumours suggest, there from RBS.     Now commentators are asking, who will be next?

The Observer speculated that total fundraising from British banks in the form of rights issues, or maybe injections from sovereign wealth funds too, could finally come in at £30bn.

So that £50bn from the central bank, and maybe another £30bn from shareholders and abroad, all in all that’s a total of £80bn, or $160bn.

The IMF recently predicted that total worldwide losses from the credit crunch could eventually move within a whisker of $1 trillion, so actually, the amount being raised in the UK could finally come in at around 20 per cent of that total.

Meanwhile in the US, the Fed has dished out around $158.95 billion so far in a scheme not dissimilar to the Bank of England effort.  

As for the US banks, Citigroup has raised around $30bn, Merrill Lynch around $12.8bn.  Other banks, such as Lehman, have raised less – $4bn in the case of Lehman.

The other big fund raiser was Swiss bank UBS, which is raising around $15bn.

Then throw into the pot the $150bn tax credit in the US, and it seems so far, while the IMF reckons around $1 trillion will fall out of the pot, around half that amount is coming back in. 

So actually, that’s not bad.

No wonder the markets have remained relatively bullish.    The Dow was up 228 points on Friday, at 12849.4 it closed at the highest level since January 3.   At this rate the Dow could even go past its start of year position of 13043.

The FTSE 100, on the other hand, is still way off that pace. In fact on Friday it merely closed at its highest level since the end of February.

The markets had further reason for cheer. Losses at  Citigroup in its first quarter were a mere $5.11 billion, compared with a profit of $5.01 billion a year earlier.  Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch lost just $1.9bn –  with a trivial $6.6bn in mortgage write-downs.

Pah.  What crisis – that $1 trillion loss will soon fade away in a puff of smoke.

Then again, smoke and mirrors can’t really solve the problem.

You really can’t magic real money out of nothing.  Central banks can of course print money, but that just leads to inflation.

Markets may be celebrating that debts are being pushed out into the open – and balance sheets are being shored up.   But looking forward, one of three things will happen.

One possibility is that banks will go back to their old ways. The moral hazard argument will stand, and because they have not been punished for their past misdeeds, they will make the same mistakes all over again.  But next time, consumer debt will have grown even further, and the next crisis will be even worse.

The second possibility is, chastened, banks will rein right back.  Their balance sheets may be fixed, but they will be reluctant to repeat the same lending mistakes.  But they will go too far, and in the general climate of tighter lending, businesses will be starved of the cash they need.  That could in turn lead to a secondary crisis as a result.

Alternatively, they could find the Goldilocks point.  They will be more cautious, yes, but not so cautious that business is starved of its life blood.

Economic performance over the next couple of years will depend on which one of those three possibilities wins out.

dow

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Bank of England readies bugle for rescue gallop

It appears the Bank of England is close to rushing in and saving the day.

According to the FT, a plan to allow the Bank of E to swap government loans for mortgage debt is set to be announced.

It works like this: mortgage debt is supposedly low risk, but banks can’t borrow against it. They can, however, borrow against government bonds. So the Bank of England will take on their mortgage debt, and offer government bonds in return. The deal will last for one to three years.

The central bank will only be taking on mortgages from before December last year. So it is trying to avoid the criticism that it is subsidising lending.

Gordon Brown is reported to be in favour of the idea.

It is of course quite similar to plans hatched in the US recently, the big difference is that the US is further into the economic downturn than the UK. So, by effectively getting ahead of the curve, is possible that such a plan could stop the UK from mirroring the US downturn too closely.

This action does however raise important issues.

The Bank of England really does need to take action like this to stop recession, but, at the same time it will in effect be taking actions to deliberately stop a house-price crash.

This in turn raises the question, why didn’t the government deliberately take action to try and slow down the housing market boom in the first place?

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Wind pushes against lean-to

It looks like we are in for another day of sharp losses. Last week’s warnings from the IMF finally took their toll in the US on Friday, with the Dow falling 256 points – although it is still well up on the levels it sunk to last month.

At the time of writing, markets across East Asia had suffered sharp falls, with the Nikkei in Japan and the Hang Seng in Hong both down by over three per cent.

On top of all the woe from the IMF, reported here last week, the US consumer confidence index published by the University of Michigan fell to a 26-year low, while the forward expectation index fell even lower.  

And the more the G7 and the likes of Gordon Brown talk about how we need to take action – and now is the time to stop talking about doing something and actually do it, and how we can keep talking and talking, but what we need is action, markets just fret that nothing seems to be working. 

The trouble is, central banks, and governments in particular, celebrated when economic growth was being promoted by an unsustainable debt bubble.  They did nothing to stop the development of this bubble.  Now, the bubble is deflating they are looking for ways to stop it.  In short, when bubbles are being created they say, “Don’t lean against the wind.”  When they are deflating, they lean against the wind, as much as they can.

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Lending to halve, but only if …

During the weekend, Steven Crawshaw, Chairman of the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) made the headlines when he warned that net lending in 2008 could reach only half last year’s level unless additional funds become available.

His words all added to the tale of woe but, actually, the headlines were a tad misleading.   For Mr Crawhsaw added, “It doesn’t have to be that way.”

Speaking at the CML’s annual lunch he said, “I suggest there are several steps needed on the part of the Bank. It needs to realise that the underlying problem may not be the one it thinks it is. Compared to the actions of the Federal Reserve in the US, our central bank stands accused of having been cautious and slow.

“The Bank has diagnosed the overhang of assets as the disease. We see it as a symptom.

“It believes that institutions are hoarding liquidity because they do not trust other banks and so are reluctant to lend to each other. We think that lenders are hoarding liquidity because they’re concerned about whether they will be able to access future funding and are managing pipelines of business very cautiously. They’re worried less about the here and now and credit risk in the UK mortgage market, than the uncertainty about whether they’ll be able to get funds when they need to refinance their own maturing debt commitments and new mortgage offers they are seeking to make.

“If our diagnosis is right, then deeper and longer term repo facilities – extending beyond the 3-month facility to 12 months or perhaps even 24 months – would definitely begin to help to address lenders’ concerns.”

In short, the Bank of England needs to do more, a lot more.

In his speech, Mr Crawshaw said, “Sometimes, lenders are criticised for being too conservative and risk averse, unwilling to lend against perfectly good propositions. Other times we stand accused of being reckless, enticing poor credit risks into unsustainable borrowing. Some of you will have heard me say at our annual conference in December that I thought the first half of my year in office would be spent defending the industry against accusations of lending to the wrong people and the second half against accusations of not lending to enough people. I was of course completely wrong. It was actually during February that the industry was accused of doing both …..and simultaneously!”

The danger is partly one of over reaction. For years banks lent too much to individuals; the danger is they will now start to lend too little to business.  The backlash could create a new set of problems.

But, there is another challenge. Our saving is far too low and consumer borrowing too high.  If this imbalance was to be truly corrected, the economic effects will be nasty indeed.

The underlying problem has a cure that can only be painful.   But it is a cure that must be administered, without starving business of the finance it needs to innovate.

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IMF warns of Ice and Fire

The IMF has been busy admitting to mistakes of being too slow to warn of the dangers of the credit crunch, but is trying to make amends now with warnings of fire and ice.

In the UK, Chancellor Alistair Darling is calling for the IMF to beef up its act.  Good idea that, deflect criticism by going for your critic’s Achilles’ heel.

Meanwhile, Capital Economics has done some sums, and after examining the IMF figure that eventual losses relating to the credit crunch will hit $945bn, said actually, that isn’t so bad.

The IMF has a newish boss. So he can happily say the IMF has made errors, without dropping himself in it.  

Yesterday, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Managing Director at the IMF, admitted the IMF was too slow off the blocks in warning of the credit crunch.  He is right there. As was said here, yesterday, 12 months ago, the IMF was saying the US would suffer only a minor slowdown this year.   Mr Straus-Kahn then said, “the question is how can we have for the future, an institution which is likely to give to different governments early warning and warning which will be listened to.”

He then went on to try and grab some headlines when he talked about ice and fire.   Ice, referring to the risk of a serious slowdown, fire the dangers of inflation.   There’s another word economists use instead of ice and fire – stagflation, but it doesn’t have quite the same ring about it, does it?

Later today, our silver chancellor is expected to say in a speech at Washington today, where the G7 is having a get together, “The IMF must focus its surveillance more closely on financial sector issues and on the links between developments in the financial sector and the real economy.

“The IMF should also strengthen its analysis of spillovers between economies, so that we have a better understanding of how difficulties in one country can be transmitted to another through the establishment of a multilateral surveillance department to shift the focus from national surveillance.”

Nice one, Al. The IMF has driven a coach and horses through your projections for the UK – especially for 2009, so why not have a go at them?

Meanwhile, Capital Economics has said words to the effect, “look, $945bn is a lot of money, but then bear in mind that it is not just the US, but the EU that is being hit by the credit crunch, as a percentage of the GDP for these two regions, actually, the amount isn’t so big.”    Apparently, the savings and loans crisis of the early ‘90s posed a greater risk.

Capital Economics added, “The $945bn figure has already dominated the headlines in the last 24 hours, but it seems to be widely misunderstood. This figure is not a forecast of what the eventual losses are likely to be, or even an estimate of the actual costs to date. Instead it is an estimate of the losses that might be realised if distressed securities had to be sold (or marked-to-market) at current prices. As such it is arguably a worst case, since these prices are now close to rock-bottom and should recover as and when market conditions improve. Indeed, there are several proposals doing the rounds whereby the authorities would buy these securities outright (rather than simply accept them as collateral for loans). This option would be a last resort, but it would cut that $945bn figure significantly.”

So, panic over then.

It’s just that if house prices start falling in Europe , in the UK, and Spain – even France is vulnerable, expect losses to mount.

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HSBC prepares to swoop: as crisis spells opportunity

When the story of this period of economic turbulence is written, one assumes much will be written about the way certain banks, and building societies which talked the property market up,  insisted the underlying fundamentals were good, and in the process helped encourage a property bubble.

For trying to install confidence in the UK housing market, no one has done more than the Halifax.

Last summer it responded to the fears that had just started doing the rounds, that the property market would suffer as borrowers came off fixed rate mortgages, by suggesting that the additional costs involved would be relatively small.

“A borrower with a £114,000 mortgage, the average in 2005, taken out at the average two-year fixed rate in 2005 of 5.08 per cent,” said the Halifax last summer, “would be making monthly repayments of £669.02. When the deal expires this year, the new monthly repayments would be £733.72 - an increase of 10 per cent or £65 - assuming that the borrower moves onto the current average two-year fixed rate of 6.04 per cent.”

It suggested that such a hike would be eminently affordable – hence its bullish predictions on house prices.

But, nine months on, of course it is a different story – and at least some people on fixed rate mortgages which are about to expire, have got serious problems.

But a white knight may have come to the rescue.  The Halifax assertion of that period may prove valid – it’s just that while the white knight may yet save the Halifax predictions, the Halifax, along with most other mortgage lenders, could be the loser.

That is, all mortgage lenders apart from HSBC, for the UK’s biggest bank, not to mention one of the biggest banks in the world, is planning an audacious swoop on the British mortgage market that could leave it as the dominant player.

HSBC is set to match existing fixed rate mortgage offers which are due to end shortly with other lenders.

In other words, HSBC is planning to rescue holders of fixed rate mortgages from their forthcoming nightmare.

It goes to show that periods of down-turn are also periods of opportunity, and for HSBC, with its strong balance sheet, now is such a time.

It also goes to show how markets can self-correct.     When prices fall too low, some companies can exploit that, and as a result, prices eventually return to the norm.

The HSBC was one of the first banks to warn of subprime difficulties – first announcing write-downs over a year ago – yet losses have remained relatively modest at the bank.

It’s just possible that the bank has played the crisis like a supreme master.

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Now the IMF runs short of money – but it has nothing to do with credit crunch – or has it?

There can be no shortage of people out there who think it is poetic justice. The International Monetary Fund, that once seemingly-almighty financial institution, is short of money. Even more poetically, it could be argued it is down to the arrogance of its policy moves during the last decade.

Bank mangers used to be unpopular individuals. How many failed businesses blamed their bank? How many individuals felt tempted to put a picture of their bank manger on the wall and throw darts at it? It is not to say that bank mangers were necessarily wrong, but to the individuals who were turned down for loans it must have seemed that way. But, during that era of plentifully available credit, which may or may not be coming to an end, bank managers appeared to have been replaced by salesmen. No longer were we required to go cap in hand to the banks if we wanted money, they were coming to us.

A similar principle applied to the IMF. But this time, it was countries that had to get the begging bowl out, and no doubt many finance ministers were made to feel two inches tall in the process. The UK was not immune, and in 1976, under the chancellorship of Dennis Healey and Prime Minister James Callaghan, the IMF bailed out the UK, or more precisely the pound, enforcing its austere regime upon the UK, and leaving the high and mighty at the Treasury with egg all over their face. In fact, Mr Healey must have felt like even more of a silly Billy in the years that followed, after the pound surged, thanks to North Sea oil. Maybe the embarrassing IMF rescue was not, in hindsight, necessary after all.

In the late 1990s though, the IMF seemed to get it wrong. When the economies of East Asia, and then Russia, hit crisis, the IMF rode in over the horizon, and, just like John Wayne, insisted everything was done its way. So that was less government expenditure and higher interest rates. Curiously, the IMF’s remedy for East Asia and Russia was the exact opposite of the approach taken by Ben Bernanke in the US right now.

The result of the IMF policy was this. Western banks by and large got their money back, and nasty crisis in the West was avoided. But many countries of East Asia, with Malaysia heading the list, and then the following year, Russia, suffered very nasty recession as a result.

The most famous critic of the IMF policy during this period is Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel memorial prize for economics.

The IMF did not mange to endear itself to the governments and people of that region; its action created a great deal of mistrust for western financial institutions. Many blamed the IMF as being solely responsible for the economic hardship that followed in those countries – and according to Stiglitz some even refer to events in their countries as either pre- or post-IMF. That’s how strongly people in the region feel about its support during that period.

Ironically though, while a Western financial crisis was avoided – even with the failure of Long Term Capital Management, which was partially caused by the Russian crisis – it could be argued that the roots of today’s credit crunch were laid.

Certainly China and Russia have gone to great lengths to ensure they never need IMF help in the future. In Russia, Western resentment grew – which explains much of the current friction between Russia and the West, while China ensured its economic boom was fuelled by savings.

China is possibly unique in the history of economics in developing while maintaining balance of payments surpluses. Its booming economy has also helped contribute to a global glut of savings – which helped underpin the borrowing boom in the US and UK.

It is a complicated web we weave, but if you squint a bit, and take a look at the current economic crisis from a certain angle, from the angle of Chinese savings and trade surpluses, you could even make a case for saying the credit crunch is down to the IMF policy decisions of 1997 and 1998.

And that brings us back to the poetic justice. For the IMF makes its money from interest payments on its loans to countries. And ever since the debacles of 1997 and 1998, customers have been thin on the ground.

Banks have changed their spots, and shed their images of being run by bank managers in the mould of Captain Mainwaring, from Dad’s Army, to a dynamic hub of financial salesmen – maybe that has also contributed to the credit crunch too, but that is another story. The IMF, on the other hand, is perhaps suffering from decades of not being sufficiently customer focused, and is now running short of money.

The solution is simple enough, though. The IMF is selling some of its gold. In all, around $6bn of gold is going to be coming up for grabs, that’s around 12 per cent of its total holdings.

As you know, gold hit its all-time high earlier this year, and although it has fallen slightly since, it still is up on the price a year ago, which itself was up on the price a year before that. It would appear that if you are going to sell gold, now is a good time.

No doubt Gordon Brown is wishing his timing had been fortuitous. He sold gold from the UK’s vaults when the price was much lower than today – bringing in much criticism – although we are not sure he could possibly have foreseen how prices were going to rise.

Interestingly, Gordon Brown has often called for the IMF to sell its gold. But Brown wanted the proceeds to be used to write-off some Third World debt – we are not sure that the IMF, which wants to generate revenue, will see it quite like that.

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