Markets ring the alarm bells: are they going too far?

Yesterday, the UK’s fourth and fifth largest banks merged. It should have been the story of the year, but in reality it is way down the pecking order in the pantheon of events that occurred yesterday. John Authers at the FT said we have all run out of superlatives, and he is right. Monday and Wednesday both saw falls of around 4.7 per cent in the Dow Jones Industrial average.

Monday saw the biggest fall in the index since 9/11. Wednesday matched that fall.

Across the world, markets are in freefall, and the sell off appears to be continuing with big falls recorded in Asia this morning. You can almost smell the whiff of panic. And as ever, in times of crisis, people look for someone to blame, and this time it’s the speculators that are getting the rap.

Are things really as bad as they are saying?

At close last night, the FTSE 100 stood at 4,912, that’s 27 per cent down on the 2007 high, and 29 per cent down on the all-time high set on the last day of the last millennium.

But the big falls are everywhere. Since August 1, the Chinese CSI 300 has fallen by 30 per cent, the Hang Seng by 22 per cent, the Nikkei by 10 per cent, and in Germany the DAX has fallen by 8 per cent. During that same time horizon the FTSE has fallen by 8 per cent, and the Dow by 7.3 per cent. More worryingly, at the time of writing the Hang Seng is down another 1,301 points, or 8 per cent in just one day.

Now all eyes turn to Morgan Stanley, will this be the next bank to get taken over? And if it is, how soon will Goldman Sachs follow?

Gold shot up in price and, regrettably, so too did oil.

It has come as something of a surprise that gold has taken so long to rise. During the second half of this year it was steadily falling. Gold of course is often a place investors go to when they fear inflation, and the failure of gold to respond when inflation was rising so fast seemed to confirm the view that the surge in inflation was just temporary.

But now the fears are deeper than that. Can the US afford to keep bailing out its venerable financial institutions? When stock markets and house prices are both in freefall, there aren’t many places left to put your money: that is why gold and oil are rising.

Some in the media are celebrating what they see as the fall of the spivs. Others see this as the end of the finance sector, banks in meltdown, the end of capitalism. One paper showed the tomb of Karl Marx, with a speech bubble coming out, showing him laughing. Marx was having the last laugh.

But this talk of doom is surely wrong.

Charles Goodhart is a top man in the world of economics. A former MPC member, his name features in economics text books – Goodhart’s Law says: “As soon as the government attempts to regulate any particular set of financial assets, these become unreliable as indicators of economic trends.” This morning, Mr Goodhart was interviewed on the Today programme and he said talk that the US government would run out of money is ridiculous.

It certainly seems to be the case that in times like this, US Treasury bills become more popular. If anything, when shares and property are so dangerous, US government backed bonds seem like a relatively safe haven.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the crisis we are seeing develop is more likely to lead to deflation, in the longer-term. The Credit Crunch means lack of credit, this means less money sloshing around, this means less demand, lower prices. In times like this, the best thing the US government could do is print money – create the money it uses to bail out banks, and the risk of inflation is modest.

Crises like this one will happen. Capitalism has many rotations of the cycle, it will see many more. Capitalism and the economic cycle are as entwined as love and marriage, and you just can’t have one without the other. Failure is one of the most important building blocks of economic evolution. You need failure from time to time in order to clean out the system; it is the equivalent of pruning in the garden.

Bubbles always see overreaction. Overreaction on the way up, overreaction on the way down. Two years ago it seemed as if the good times would last for ever. We were told that the rising debt levels were affordable because they were matched by rising asset values. The view that this was unsustainable was laughed at.

Now, of course, those who were so positive are laughing on the other side of their face.

But it will pass. The key to seeing an end to this crisis lies in how rapidly it can unwind. The speed of collapse is truly stunning and, superficially at least, quite frightening. Yet in a way, this is a good thing.

Japan’s lost decade was characterized with a very slow sell-off. There was a drip–drip of bad news, as authorities and banks tried to deny what was happening. It is not like that now. It is scary, but that is good.

Speculators are getting the blame. Even Vince Cable, the most economically literate of all leading politicians in the UK today, is blaming speculators. And George Soros, that poacher turned gamekeeper, says speculators have been behind the rising price of oil, saying they forced it too high, and may push oil too low on the way down.

Yet, if we look back at 1992 with the benefit of hindsight, it appears Soros did the UK a favour. The ejection from the ERM that his selling enforced, marked the beginning of the UK’s economic recovery.

These spivs, as the tabloids are calling them, have done little more than accelerate events. HBOS and Lloyds may not have merged this week, the HBOS disaster may have been delayed, but it would still have happened.

The pressure on investment banks in the US, with speculators shorting their stock, may well lead to their takeover sooner rather than later. But, frankly, it seems that these takeovers were going to happen anyway, though maybe later rather than sooner.

Merrill Lynch was taken over by Bank of America within 48 hours from the point talks were kicked off. The purchase of HBOS by Lloyds seems to have been confirmed even faster.

The speed with which all this is happening needs to be applauded – it provides the single biggest reason to hope the crisis will come to an end all the quicker.

What is quite interesting though is this. Almost 100 hundred years separated the Tulip and South Sea Bubbles. Eight years have separated the dotcom and debt/housing bubble. How long before the next bubble?

Or are we seeing a continuation of the crisis that saw the dotcom crash, Enron and WorldCom? After all, the FTSE 100 is still lower than its peak set on 31 December 1999. The Dow Jones has fallen below its dotcom peak.

Maybe the housing/debt bubble hid us from the truth – and in the process made the inevitable unravelling all the more serious.

Maybe the main lesson we can learn from this episode is that boom and bust can not be stopped. And attempts to try tend, if anything, to make things worse. Maybe the current financial crisis is as serious as it is for the simple reason that the boom lasted too long.

Maybe the best thing we can do is not try and stop these periodic downturns and crises, but try and make the downturns as short as possible.

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The real ‘shorters’ are us all

Times of crisis tend to bring out extreme views. This morning the ether is full of dark talk; talk about the end of capitalism, how it will all end in war. Meanwhile, across the media the search is on for someone to blame, and you don’t need to think hard to guess who is getting the flak. It is all those city whizz kids, or as the Express calls them the spivs, with their fat bonuses, and reward for failure.

Yet it seems the talk of pessimism has gone too far. We are no more witnessing the end of capitalism, than we were witnessing the end of history when the Soviet Union came to an end.

Capitalism is working – recessions and downturns are essential for its success.

That the world is changing, and that the US is losing its slot as the world’s only superpower, is palpably true, but that does not make war inevitable. Capitalism provides the single biggest reason why there will be no world war. You only need to look towards Russia, and its own economic crisis to see why this is so. The world today is more integrated than ever before. Globalisation has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people in China and India out of poverty.

Capitalism is creating wealth – real wealth, and it can only work with cooperation. There is no reason to fear its end. The days of empire building are over. With the Internet leading the way, we are entering an era of open markets, of open standards, of cooperation, as even the largest corporates cooperate with their rivals in R&D.

The biggest danger lies with us. It is too easy to blame bankers, too easy to predict the end of capitalism.

In reality we need to look closer to home. The real danger is that the backlash will put an end to the very forces that create wealth. Talk of a return to traditional banking has been kicked off again. This is the last thing we need – traditional banking will kill the flow of money required to fund innovation, including money required to fund renewable energy.

Some blame the speculators – shorting stock.

But there are other ‘shorters’ out there. There are other people selling us short. These are the people who are releasing their venom on financial institutions, and blaming everyone but themselves for the economic crisis.

The reality is different. The real causes of this crisis lie elsewhere. The greed is not just the greed of bankers, it is the greed of Joe Public. Those who have been shorting the economy are the popular media.

Now is the time for seeing things for what they are. This is a nasty economic crisis – but that is all it is. It will end. It won’t be like the 1930s. We are not really seeing meltdown in the financial sector.

Unless, that is, we listen too hard to the hysterical reaction of some of the media and some politicians.

The economic success enjoyed by China is not bad news, it is good news.

Modern banking and sophisticated financial procedures provide the single biggest reason to believe in a prosperous future.

Capitalism is working. Errors have been made, and these errors are being corrected. But we all need to face up to reality and see this crisis for what it really is. Take a hard look at your reflection in the mirror.

The popular media say we have become an economy that doesn’t produce anything. That we have made money from nothing, and now we are paying the price.

Well that is true up to a point, but not for the reasons stated. The current crisis is, above all, born of an unsustainable bubble in house prices. This created the view we could make money, save for our pensions, and thrive just by watching our home go up in value.

Money was lent on the assumption that the assets it was secured against would always go up.

This is the real reason for the mistakes made by financiers. And it was a tacit conspiracy, one most of us took part in. Bankers are no more to blame than those who borrowed the money they lent.

If house prices had kept going up this crisis would never have happened. Because this was impossible, the crisis has erupted. And that is all it is about.

For years we cheered at news that house prices had gone up, and failed to grasp the real poison this explosion had created.

Ultimately, the problem faced by banks is that they lent money in unprecedented proportions to fund activity that did not add to the nation’s productivity. Bank balance sheets are taking a battering because people are struggling to repay debt.

To deal with this crisis we need to save more. But saving itself can create a recession as aggregate demand across the economy contracts. That is why this economic crisis is serious.

But we will adjust. The gains from business are now so great, the potential so vast, the global economy so rich in innovation and dynamism, that the recovery will follow, it will follow within a few years, and when it does it will be just as dramatic as the crash.

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Markets stagger under blinding light, as they remove heads from sand

Imagine what a shock it must be for the ostrich that removes its head from the sand. One can imagine its serenity turn to panic, and its demeanour turn from that of an all-too-cool bird, to something akin to a headless chicken, blinded by the bright light of reality.

That is what happened yesterday. On an optimistic/pessimistic scale of one to ten, with ten representing pure optimism about the economy, and one pure pessimism, this column has probably been around level three – expressing considerable pessimism about the economy in the short-term, although much more positive about the longer-term prospects. Markets have got it wrong over and over again. Inexplicably the Dow hit an all-time high last October – after the credit crunch had begun. Throughout this year, the slightest whiff of good news, or even news that was really bad but superficially looked good, saw markets soaring. Last week, when the US government took the unprecedented step of nationalising Fannie and Freddie, markets soared and we were told the worst was now over.

When Alistair Darling talked about the worst conditions in 60 years, he was ridiculed.

The markets, many of the world’s economists and commentators had their heads so firmly buried in the ground that they could not see reality, and totally failed to judge the seriousness of the current crisis.

Yesterday, their eyes were removed from the ground after months in the dark; they were left blinking and shielding their vision from the unbearable light, and they panicked.

For months they failed to call the seriousness of this crisis. Yesterday, they went the other way. All of a sudden the media is talking about meltdown, about how no bank is safe, the impending and systematic collapse of the financial system. Once again, they have got it wrong. They have overreacted.

Consider the dotcom bust. One moment dotcoms were the greatest thing since sliced bread, and probably a great deal greater even than that. The next moment, any internet business was hailed as a disaster. Forward wind the clock eight years or so on, and the reality is at last striking home. The internet really is hugely important technology, perhaps the single most important innovation since the printing press, and its impact on the global economy is only just beginning. The markets totally failed to understand the internet, and its significance. They jumped in too fast, funded businesses based on the most dodgy of plans, then because these no-hopers proved to represent a bad investment, turned on the internet, like a child on its one favourite toy. 

And yesterday we saw a familiar pattern.

That is not in any way to understate the seriousness of the financial crisis. The collapse of Lehman, the troubles afflicting AIG and the hasty sale of Merrill Lynch all confirm something that those whose heads weren’t buried in the ground understood all along.

But this does not mean the end of Barclays, or HBOS. It does not mean the mattress is the only safe place to store our money.

The US Treasury, and its top man, Hank Paulson, who remember is the former boss of Goldman Sachs, made a calculated decision in letting Lehman go.

You have to have some sympathy with its staff. The bank’s mistake was not that it was incompetent, it was that it wasn’t incompetent enough. It made massive errors, but these mistakes were not on the scale seen at Bear Stearns. If it had failed at the beginning of this year, it would have been rescued.

But that was before the banks had been given time to digest the full implications of the credit crunch; it was before the Fed had taken many of its drastic steps to restore liquidity. Mr Paulson figured that the failure of Bear Stearns would have been catastrophic. Lehman Brothers’ collapse, on the other hand, he reasoned would not bring the financial industry down with it.

It’s those two words, moral hazard, that remain the key. Bail out a bank, it doesn’t learn its lesson. For decades, banks have been saved. Alan Greenspan steered the US economy free of serious recession for years, but he did this by bailing out the system every time it hit a problem.

But the electorate are fed up with it. Those who vote in governments are fed up with seeing this regular cycle of banks’ exuberance leading to crash. They reason that they are not learning their lesson.

Evolution favours those who are best adapted to survive. For decades, governments have made the forces of natural selection, when applied to the finance sector, impotent.

Yet this morning, on the Today programme, one commentator ventured the view that politicians were pandering to the whim of their voters. Bankers are never popular. When they receive six-, or even seven-, figure bonuses, public sympathy evaporates. In this environment of envy, it is argued the public want to see the banks punished, without understanding the implications of this.

Yesterday evening, on BBC2 Newsnight, Anatole Kaletsky was scathing of Hank Paulson’s decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers. He drew a parallel with Andrew Mellon, US Treasury Secretary in 1929, who was happy to see banks liquidated. Mr Kaletsky argued that the real villains are the hedge funds, that it is they who have created the problems for Lehman.

He argued that it is the banks with long-term plans, who are looking ahead, who are suffering. The hedge funds, pre-occupied with the short-term, are creating problems, and that the government should have saved Lehman from these scoundrels.

Furthermore, goes the argument, it should have supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, lent them money rather than nationalise them.

But at heart, the crisis we are seeing is down to one key error.

The error relates to house prices – the view that they always go up, and any loan secured on a property is safe, because the property will always be worth more than the loan.

This is the true lesson of this crisis. The complexity of the bank’s financial dealings has hidden this truth.

The solution to this crisis lies in the speed with which markets adjust.

The mistake made in Japan ten or so years ago was denial.

History tells us that markets only tend to turn when just about everyone has given up on them.

Right now we may be seeing that moment.

And one piece of news developed yesterday; it hardly showed up on most media’s radar, but in some ways it is just as significant. To find out what that is, read the next article.

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Bank losses – how do they compare with past profits?

The IMF forecast total losses from the Credit crunch will top $1 trillion, and now we have just passed the halfway mark. But then again, don’t be surprised if the IMF ups its forecast soon – with house prices crashing like they are, it seems many more debts will go unpaid yet.

But here is a stat to really make you sit up. According to the FT, so far Merrill Lynch’s losses have come in at $14bn, while write downs are at $52bn. To put that in perspective, since the bank was first listed in 1971 total inflation adjusted profits total just $56bn, calculates the FT. In other words, losses from the credit crunch so far amount to no less than 25 per cent of cumulative profits.

It’s really quite stunning, and presumably other US banks are suffering just as much.

It is no wonder that Kenneth Rogoff, former chief economist at the IMF, has said that one large US bank will fail in months. In fact, Mr Rogoff put it quite colourfully: “We’re going to see a whopper, we’re going to see a big one, one of the big investment banks or big banks.”

The thing is, what should the authorities do?

And come to that, what should the authorities do about crashing house prices?

Opinion seems to be split down the middle. Some say that every time a bank is rescued, inflationary pressures are being built up for the future. Then they add, how can the banks learn their lessons if they are not allowed to fail.

Then, closer to home – literally closer to home, the call is going out for the government to rescue house prices. It is strange isn’t it, how when prices were rising too fast, any government that tried to put a stop to it would have been lambasted by the property industry for interfering with the market. Now, all the industry wants is for the government to do something – even if that something involves throwing taxpayers’ money at trying to solve a problem that can only be solved by letting prices fall to a realistic level. (Can you imagine the stink if the government tried to subsidise BP and Shell if the price of oil suddenly started to fall?)

Then again, if banks do fail, and the government refused to pick up the pieces, the result could be years and years of negative growth, or to use the ‘d’ word – depression.

The argument that rescuing banks could lead to inflation, ignores the deflationary effect of doing nothing. So far, more than $500bn has been sucked out of the system. Some, but not all, has been replaced through new money. The deflationary dangers are very serious – talk that rescuing banks could lead to inflation is way wide of the mark.

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UK to contract next year, warns economics group

The most damning assessment yet was published on the prospects for the UK economy by the economics consultancy Capital Economics this morning. Their central projection is for the UK economy to contract modestly next year – and recover only very gradually in 2010. But their report also hints at the possibility of a much more serious economic slowdown than that.

It was told here yesterday how many economic forecasts seem to base their projections on data which itself is often flawed. Maybe that is why there has been a total failure to predict the story that has now unfolded. The application of common sense, however, would have yielded much more pertinent conclusions.

Capital Economics seems to take greater account of the more anecdotal type surveys – that’s the type that ask consumers or manufacturers if things are better or worse than a year ago. They also seem a little more willing to use a dollop of thinking, and as a result their projections are often quite different from the forecasts produced by the likes of the IMF or OECD. On the downside, they have been predicting a major fall in house prices for so long, that it could be argued that it was inevitable they would be right eventually. But on the other hand, they did successfully predict a major slowdown in the US economy a year or so in advance, and their predictions for the UK and Eurozone were fairly close to the mark too.

The UK seems to have three types of problem, goes their rather downbeat assessment. Firstly, the various business surveys also seem to paint a picture of growing gloom. Secondly, the economic slowdown in the Eurozone, and growing likelihood that the US will slow again later this year, is making it harder for the UK to export its way out of trouble.

Thirdly is the area of bank lending, and this is the area which the big concern relates to.

Capital Economics argues that unless banks raise more capital, or sell off more assets, they may have to curtail lending by about 7 per cent. This would be a highly significant development. In fact, bank lending has not contracted since 1965. In the US in the early 1930s bank lending fell by more than 50 per cent; in Japan between the late 1990s and early 2000s, bank lending contracted by 30 per cent. So while a 7 per cent contraction in bank lending in the UK will be serious, it won’t apparently be in the same league as the contraction that helped create the US depression and Japan’s lost decade. However, in Finland, between 1990 and 1996 bank lending contracted by 11 per cent, and the result was a 12 per cent drop in real GDP over that period.

If banks do see their asset base contract by 7 per cent, Capital Economics predicts a 1.5 per cent contraction in GDP, meaning the UK slowdown will be as serious as the recession of the early 1990s.

But at last, here is some good news. It is assuming banks will have some success in repairing their balance sheets – and no doubt this is right. They may struggle to raise all the money they require, but it seems likely they will raise more than they have secured to date.

Based on this less pessimistic, but more realistic, assumption, Capital Economics reckons the UK will contract by 0.2 per cent next year, with this contraction sandwiched between 1.2 per cent growth in 2008 and 1 per cent growth in 2010.

It is the most negative forecast published so far, but, frankly, it is probably the most realistic. It will surely be a surprise if the UK does now manage to avoid an outright recession. It seems, instead, the key will be how bad the recession is.

But at least a recession will lead to lower demand for goods and services, which will curtail inflation – and hopefully will make things more affordable in the longer-term. The recovery will surely depend on how soon the improvements in affordability occur.

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Is a depression on its way: history says Yes, but what does common sense say?

Take a sniff, do you smell it? Asset prices are crashing. House prices are down. It’s more than eight years since the FTSE 100 hit its peak. The Dow is lower than its pre-dotcom bust high. That feels a lot more like the 1930s and Japan’s lost decade than it does the 1970 period of stagflation.

If inflation is always a monetary phenomenon, then the credit crunch will surely lead to a crunch in the supply of money. Money is, after all, created by debt. Economic theory would suggest a credit crunch would lead to deflation, not inflation.

That is why many fear we are close to a 1930s type depression. Well, probably not. The economy has an awful lot going for it right now, and we are supposed to know what we should do to avoid a repeat of the mistakes that characterized that period.

But maybe we can learn from history. This is the scary bit. In the past, economic depression followed every 50 years. Okay, it’s nearer 70 years since the beginning of the last great depression. But these things are not pin point accurate.

The is no shortage of theories to suggest the economy follows a cycle – its turnings and rotation as inevitable as the rising and setting of the sun. If that is true, then we are due a downturn.

Maybe, though, you see this as hocus pocus. The pattern of history, no more than half coincidences, and half the laws of probability, throwing up occasional convergences, because that’s the way numbers work.

So, does that mean depression beckons? Or can we throw the theory of inevitable rise and fall in the dustbin?

Winston Churchill once said: “The further back you look, the further forward you can see.” But on this occasion he may have been slightly off. Circumstances occasionally conspire to throw up similar outcomes, but that does not mean history repeats itself.

Yet, there is a constant. One law never changes – human nature. We are the same everywhere, and every time. When the stock market in China booms beyond all reasonable fundamentals, we are told that in China it is different – that we are mistakenly applying western values to oriental practice. Yet, the Chinese stock market bubble burst all the same. Despite all the grand ideas of Confucianism breeding a way of thought that is alien to western ideology, we discovered that actually we are all the same really. The truth is Humans have the same motivations, always.

And that is the common thread of history. It is human nature. That is why Mark Twain was closer to the truth than Britain’s famous wartime Prime Minister, when he said: “History never repeats itself, but it rhymes.”

The lesson of history then is not that time is a monotonous cycle of repetition. It’s not like classical music with its structure. It is more like jazz, full of improvisation. But, clues still lurk in the manuscript of history which can throw light on the present and hints about the future. There is nothing more important than trying to understand this. Here is an attempt to throw some light on this.

So, as Jimmy Page and Robert Plant once said: “Listen very carefully, for the tune will come to you at last.”

Teenagers. Are you misfortunate enough to be a parent of teenagers? Or maybe you work with them, perhaps as a teacher, or maybe you are one, in which case all that is left to be said is cover up your eyes, for the next few sentences are not going to be pretty.

Teenagers just don’t want to learn from us. You can tell them the right thing to do. You can say, “Learn from my mistakes.” But they won’t. Alas, they learn through doing, and all you can do is pray, just like your parents did, that the learning of the lesson will not be too painful.

Yet, teenagers’ inability to learn without trial and error is not really limited to those spotty gits at all. None of us are really good at taking heed of what our parents say.

Maybe that is why we have the so called Kondratieff cycle.

This cycle was first dreamt up by a man who, funnily enough, was also called Kondratieff. Well, that wasn’t his full name, he was called Professor Nickolai Kondratieff and he was a true wise man who really did seem to hear the rhythm of history – at least of economic history. Yet his wisdom failed him in one respect. He failed to foresee the impact his ideas would have on the Soviet government that controlled his fate. Poor old Nicky, his ideas were of true insight, but he ended his days at the pleasure of Joseph Stalin before being sentenced to death in around 1938.

But his insight was to observe four key stages in an economic cycle – something he reckoned to be around 54 years long.

Stage one was spring – also described as an inflationary growth phase. So stage one in the current Kondratieff cycle would be that period from around 1950 to the late 1960s. In the previous cycle it would probably be from about 1896, which marked the end of the late Victorian depression, to the outbreak of World War I.

Stage two in the Kondratieff cycle is known as the summer stagflation phase. So that would apply to the 1970s and early 1980s.

This stage in the Kondratieff cycle often coincides with war. So in the current cycle it was the Vietnam War, in the previous cycle World War I. It has been suggested that the American Civil War and the Napoleonic War coincide with the previous summer phase in the Kondratieff cycle.

Stage three in the Kondratieff cycle is known, strangely enough, as the autumn phase. This is considered to be something of a plateau period, and often sees the combination of growth and deflation. So that is the roaring 1920s in the US, and one assumes the period during the late 1980s and 1990s, and no doubt including that era central bankers now refer to as Nice – non inflationary consistently expansionary – which has only just come to an end.

Bet you can’t guess what season applies to stage four. Give up already? Well, it’s winter. And quelle surprise, winter is not associated with a particularly pleasant economic period.

The last Kondratieff cycle ended with the Great Depression – which led into World War II. In the previous cycle the global economy fell into a phase now known as the Long Depression, between around 1873 to 1896, and the 1830s too saw a deep depression.

Now that is all very interesting and a little uncanny, when you consider the similarities with today. The noughties crash in stocks and shares, followed by house prices, had all the hallmarks of previous precursors to depressions. The 1930s and Japan’s lost decade being obvious examples. The credit crunch, too, seems likely to lead to deflation – again the hallmark of a depression.

So that is all a bit worrying.

But then consider this. We have all heard of the theories of Nostradamus, and no doubt we have all been subjected to some kind of mumbo jumbo prediction of doom. Well, social science has its own theories, but they differ from astrology because they do at least try to apply science.

Back in the 1990s, book authors William Strauss and Neil Howe published a book called The Fourth Turning.

To be honest, the book does ramble on a bit. But it does contain an interesting idea: in fact the idea is pretty core to the book’s underlying thesis.

Strauss and Howe say society goes though four stages – each stage roughly the length of a human lifetime – which they say is around 80 years. But their base idea does make sense. Consider family businesses. They start off with their innovative founder, often they are passed on to an even more innovative son, followed by a not quite so focused grandson and the next generation really are more interested in partying.

Without getting too hung up on the four-generation thing, consider Ancient Rome; Augustus and Julius Caesar himself seem to have been quite brilliant. But go down the family tree, and you find monsters like Caligula and Nero.

But Strauss and Howe try to be more specific than that. They detail four stages: survivor, creator, consumption driven and, finally, the flaccid generation. But their theory uses more colourful language and they refer to four “turnings”– a High, an Awakening, an Unravelling, and a Crisis. They then argue we are not stage four- crisis in the cycle.

The big problem with these theories though is that they are rather inclined to take a series of coincidences, and try and extrapolate a correlation that isn’t really there.

Mathematicians have claimed to prove the Bible follows a mathematical formula. Do you believe that?

But the real problem seems to be us. Have you noticed that the last the last 1o paragraphs either begin with the letter S and T, which come immediately after each other in the alphabet, the letter B, which, spookily enough, is the second letter of the alphabet, or M or W, which kind of look like each other, especially if you turn one of the letters upside down. Strange indeed.

The truth is, though, that there is no pattern. You can create any pattern you like after the event – but it is no guide to the future. So the first year Bjorn Borg wins Wimbledon he doesn’t shave for the whole fortnight, therefore he doesn’t shave again when he plays at Wimbledon. And would you believe it, he wins every year.

But of course Borg did get beaten eventually. And this is where these theories of patterns break down. Once a pattern stops working it ceases to be meaningful. This is what Nassim Nicholas Taleb was referring to in his book The Black Swan. We used to believe all swans were white, until, that is, the discovery of black swans in Australia.

The repetition of history only exists in hindsight.

And bear this in mind too. Modern history is a short affair. Just because economic depressions came about 50 years apart for a century or so, it doesn’t mean they always will. This is a terribly unscientifically short sample from which to make a conclusion. Besides, some argue, the Long Depression of the late 19th century wasn’t a depression at all, just a series of recessions.

But human nature, however, is a constant. We tend to react in the same way to similar circumstances.

So when markets rise, we tend to get over excited, and we then get carried away and jump on like lemmings.

When demand for a good is higher than supply we quickly see an opportunity. But this in turn crowds the market. It becomes a victim of its own success.

There is no inevitable cycle – the cycle is simply the product of human folly and our refusal to learn from the past.

That’s why bankers in the early noughties failed to spot the similarities with the previous banking orgy. That’s why the oil industry failed to realise that when oil was priced at $10 a barrel demand would rise to such a level that supply would be incapable of meeting demand.

This is why the truly insightful investor buys when everyone else is selling and sells when everyone else is buying.

But it is a risky strategy. Get the timing wrong and you look stupid. So fund managers often find it safer to go against their instinct and run with the herd. No one gets fired if they make the same mistake everyone else is making. But the contrarian who goes against the pack and gets it wrong is out of a job as fast as you can say Kondratieff.

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BIS to Fed and Co: “That’s another fine mess you have got us into”

“You there, Bernanke, isn’t it? Go to the headmaster’s office. You, King, join him.” Just then there was a knock on the door; it was last year’s head boy, who had returned to re-take a course. “You asked to see me, Sir,” said the former top boy. “Greenspan,” came the reply, “you are expelled!”

Yesterday it was a lot like that. The Bank of International Settlements has been described as the central bank’s central bank. Yesterday it seemed to take on the persona of that really strict teacher everyone was frightened of. And the boys and girls under the rap were the great and the good of the economic world.

They were slammed. The problem that haunts the global economy was laid out in clear, and quite distressingly lucid, detail, and a solution, was proposed.

Of the great economic crisis of 2008, yesterday saw one of the most important developments.

The most deadly venom was saved for the report’s last sentence: “Businesses” it concluded, “and banks are expected to undertake business continuity planning in advance of trouble. Surely we should expect as much from policymakers.”

And in a way that says it all. Our policymakers, it appears, let us down. The answer: quick, transparent, decisive action. None of this business of trying to appease shareholders with big dividend payments. Massive bonus payments must stop. Losses must be declared. Debts repaid.

It will be tough, “But,” said BIS, “if history is any guide, failing to make such efforts will eventually entail recourse to still more expensive and dangerous measures during the crisis itself.”

But there is a snag. You may have had that experience at school, when your teacher leans over you, face red with fury, admonishing you, telling you to fix your mistake, but not telling you how. The BIS report did smack a little of that.

The problem, according to the BIS, is that central banks and governments misdiagnosed what was going on. “For many years,” it said, “global inflation was maintained at low levels, aided by the tailwinds of numerous positive and overlapping supply shocks arising from deregulation and technical progress, but perhaps due even more to the entry of major emerging economies into the global trading system. However, instead of temporarily allowing inflation to drift lower, analogously to the past treatment of negative supply shocks, policymakers interpreted this quiescence of inflation differently. They took it to mean that there was no good reason to raise interest rates when growth accelerated, and no impediment to lowering them when growth faltered. It is not fanciful, surely, to suggest that these low levels of interest rates might inadvertently have encouraged imprudent borrowing, as well as the eventual resurgence of inflation.”

Well, over five years ago now, Investment and Business News said: “If inflation is not the result of the current monetary and fiscal policies of governments and central banks, then every economic text book ever written will have been torn up.”

The good news: the text books can remain. The trees that were felled in their creation were not lost in vain.

The bad news: well it seems the banks made a massive mistake. You may recall, a few years ago the talk was of deflation. Greenspan and Co were scared we were in danger of experiencing a Japanese style period of deflation. So they slashed interest rates. But they were perhaps a little mixed up. Back then, low prices were not down to low demand, which is what caused deflation in Japan; prices were falling because the world had got better at producing things. It was a good thing prices were falling. Wages were not falling, we were getting better off.   But, in this wonderful environment of improved technology and increased specialisation that comes with globalization, we celebrated too much. The result, asset prices shot up. House prices went through the roof.

The fundamental problem, it seems, is that we, that’s all of us, you and me, are not good at learning from the past. Churchill once said: “The further backward you look, the further forward you can see.” Mark Twain said: “History never repeats itself, but it rhymes.”

Yet, whenever there is a boom, the same old clichés are dragged out. “This time it is different.” “It is a new paradigm, now.” The BIS called it an “inherent tendency to ‘procyclicality’ in liberalised financial systems. That is, as credit expansion fuels cyclical economic growth, asset prices and optimism rise while perceptions of risk recede. This further supports credit expansion, not least through the provision of more collateral to allow more borrowing, leading to spending patterns that could eventually prove unsustainable. Initial rational exuberance might in this way become irrational, setting the stage for a possible subsequent collapse.”

The central banks, by slashing interest rates, created the seeds for today’s crisis. Then the temptation to overdo things when times are good got the better of us.

And boy, is the problem intractable? The BIS is worried about inflation and deflation. “There are dangers in saying that food and energy prices can be ignored in setting domestic policy because they are externally driven,” it said. “For the world as a whole, these are not external supply shocks, but rather seem to have been primarily demand-driven. These examples indicate that our domestic frameworks for policymaking need to be better adapted to the realities of globalisation.”

The solution then, is that interest rates need to go up… everywhere. This will curtail demand, and bring inflation under control. This may of course create recession in some countries, the UK, US, Ireland and Spain, presumably the favourites.

But then there’s another danger. The BIS said: “… that households facing heavy debt burdens, and sometimes falling house prices, will seek to raise secularly low saving rates by cutting consumption quite sharply. The fact that in the United States and some other advanced industrial countries the stocks of houses, cars and other durables already seem rather high could encourage such behaviour. Unfortunately, everyone cannot save more simultaneously, since one person’s spending is another person’s income. The end result of such a process would be lower economic activity and employment, not only in these countries, but also in those reliant on exporting to them.”

And the conclusion: “If asset prices are unrealistically high, they must eventually fall. If saving rates are unrealistically low, they must rise. And if debts cannot be serviced, they must be written off. Trying to deny this through the use of gimmicks and palliatives will only make things worse in the end.”

“Government’s actions should be quick and decisive, with the clear objective of removing all uncertainty about future private sector losses. This happened in the Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s, whereas in Japan the government took too long to act decisively.”

“… losses should fall heavily on those who incurred them in the beginning: first the borrowers and then those who lent unwisely to them. In practice, however, the possible implications of widespread household bankruptcies (including resulting litigation) would also have to be seriously considered.”

“If the public sector chooses to socialise the losses, it should be done explicitly and transparently, without shifting potential losses onto the balance sheets of central banks. In practice, however, as was seen in Japan in the early 1990s, inadequate legislation pertaining to deposit insurance gave the central bank very little alternative to providing emergency assistance to insolvent institutions.”

Finally, says BIS: “The moral hazard associated with the use of government money should be counterbalanced by the introduction of forward-looking measures to prevent similar problems arising in the future.”

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Markets tumble again – wage inflation drops – is this more like the 1930s than the 1970s?

While all around the panic relates to inflation, and that we are in danger of seeing a re-run of the 1970s, more evidence emerged yesterday to suggest that the reality is quite different.

The 1970s, remember, were characterised by rising unemployment and rising prices.    The Great Depression was characterised by rising unemployment and falling prices.

The 1970s crisis was initially kicked off by a surge in the price of oil, which led to an upward spiral of wage inflation.  The era was characterised by strong union activity,  and loose monetary policy – with negative real interest rates in many economies.

The 1920s/1930s depression was initially kicked off by falling asset prices, followed by banking collapse.  It was a similar story in Japan in the 1990s.

When the stock market crashed in 1929, major indices did not return to their previous high until the early 1950s.   House prices fell in the UK during the 1930s.

In a way it would actually be quite good if the present crisis was more like the earlier one.    Policy makers in the 1920s and 1930s, and Japan more recently, made a series of mistakes.   Japanese banks were slow to admit to the full extent of their losses.  It seems unlikely – fingers crossed, those same mistakes will be repeated.

But the similarities with the 1970s are obvious too.  Oil keeps rising.  Although oil is much more expensive, even after allowing for inflation, than it was the 1970s, these days our consumption of oil takes up a smaller proportion of GDP.  Oil would need to approach $200 and demand stay at current levels before our oil consumption to GDP was comparable to the 1970s.   It does, however, seem quite possible this will happen.

Evidence of mounting inflation is everywhere – and around the world.  In the UK, producer price inflation keeps hitting new all-time highs.  But inflation is also a major problem in developing economies, including China, India, Russia, Brazil and Eastern Europe.

In the UK, evidence has emerged to suggest a new wave of strikes may begin.   If inflation worsens, and union pressure leads to inflationary wage increases, then the only possible medicine will be sharp rises in the rate of interest, just at a time when slowing consumer spending, collapsing house prices and struggling industry suggest a desperate need for interest rates to be slashed.

But here is the other side of the argument, an argument that was strengthened yesterday.

Markets are down again.  The FTSE 100 fell to 5723, 700 points below its start-of-year price.    It is now 1,000 points below its seven-year high set last year, and more to the point is 1200 points below the all-time high of 6930 set on the last day of the last millennium.  So in effect we are sill in a bear period.  A bear period lasting eight and a half years – which we think is the longest bear run since the big one kicked off in 1929.

In the US, it is not quite so severe.    The Dow hit its pre-dotcom crash peak on January 14 2000 – with a score of 11722.    It passed that level in 2006, and at no stage this year has it fallen lower – although it did go within 20 points in March of this year.  Right now the Dow is over 300 points above that mark – although it has fallen 500 points this week so it is quite possible it will fall below that mark soon.

But bear in mind the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s saw either deflation or very modest inflation.    Inflation today is much higher, and after allowing for rising prices, it seems the Dow is actually lower today – that’s in real terms, than in 2000.

More to the point, the NASDAQ is still only half of the heady heights it reached during the dotcom peak.

In other words, it is not just house prices that are falling off the edge of a cliff; US and UK major indices have suffered an appalling eight years or so.

But then yesterday also saw the unveiling of the latest UK job statistics.

It made the TV and radio news headlines  – UK unemployment rose by 38,000, hitting 5.3 per cent, from 5.2 per cent the previous month.  

It is no surprise.  Sven-Goran Eriksson and Avram Grant are not the only people to have joined the dole queue lately.    We all know that over the next few months jobs will be lost in the City, in retail and the housing sector.

Then again, by historical standards, unemployment is still low; will it stay low?

And this is when the debate gets interesting.

Because yesterday, to accompany news of the relatively small rise in unemployment, came another statistic which was more significant, but has not fallen under the full glare of the public spotlight.

Average earnings, including bonuses, rose by 3.8 per cent in the year to April 2008, down from 4.0 per cent in March. Average earnings, excluding bonuses or regular pay, rose by 3.9 per cent in the year to April, up from 3.8 per cent in March.

Remember, the retail price index rose by 4.2 per cent in the year to April.  So it appears earnings have not kept pace with inflation.

Normally, wages are only creating inflationary pressure if their rate of change, minus improvements in productivity, is above the official inflation target.      Economic productivity rose by 1.7 per cent over the year, so yes, wages are going up a little faster than they should, but only by a tiny amount.

Unions do not the have the muscle they once did. A repeat of the winter of discontent seems unlikely.  There has been plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest some workers at least are accepting pay cuts.

This is a trend to watch.    So far it would seem that despite the escalating rises in oil and food, the dreaded secondary effect on wages is just not happening.

This is good news, but it could turn to bad news.  Central banks need to watch this very carefully.  Remember, there is typically an 18-month time lag between a change in the rate of interest and its full impact.

The combination of rising unemployment, falling asset prices – both property and equities, and modest wage rises which could easily turn into wage falls, means there is a real threat of deflation.

The challenge facing central banks is to anticipate deflation 18 months in advance, so that they can relax lending in time. 

Right now, central banks seem to have an almost unprecedented balancing act.  The economy could go either way – inflation or deflation.  One wrong move – and it could be disastrous.

Senior management at commercial banks may be overpaid, but right now, central bankers deserve every penny of their remuneration.
markets 08

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The great shift – have we diagnosed the wrong economic disease?

The last few days have seen a new development – a development that is so far barely showing up on the media’s radar screen – but could yet prove to be both the most important and, if ignored, the most dangerous development yet in the economic crisis of 2008.

In the story of 20th century recessions, there were two big ones.  There were the late 1920s and 1930s (1930s in the US) and the 1970s.     They were both awful, although for most economies the earlier crisis was the worst, but they were also very different.

The 1970s crisis was sparked off by the escalating price of oil – this pushed up prices and led to inflation, while unemployment rose at the same time.    The twin curses of rising inflation and unemployment were referred to as stagflation.

The earlier downturn was kicked off initially via a crash in asset prices, followed by various banking crises and the nasty period of depression – which saw falling prices, or deflation.

In the mid 1990s, what has become known as the lost decade of Japanese growth, was quite similar to the 1930s depression.  Asset prices fell, losses at banks mounted, followed by banking collapse.   Japan experienced deflation – and the central bank of the Rising Sun suffered the shock of discovering that once prices are falling, conventional monetary policy becomes largely ineffective.   You can’t set negative interest rates – otherwise consumers stick their cash under their mattress, and once deflation falls to a level so that even zero interest rates are ineffective, then the central bank is truly stuck.

This begs the question, which of these two crises from the past is the current crisis most alike?  It is an important question, because the economic medicine required is quite different.  In fact, if the wrong medicine is diagnosed, things could actually be made much worse.

When he came up with his famous theory of general employment, Keynes was working during the midst of depression-torn Britain.    His recommendations were adopted by the Roosevelt government in the US in what became known as the ‘new deal.’    Keynes’ cure to a depression involves measures designed to get demand up.  So that’s cuts in interest rates, government spending designed to create employment, and tax cuts aimed especially at low-income earners.    Why the low-income earners especially?  Well this was not necessarily a moral argument, rather the idea was based on economic theory.  Low wage owners tend to save less, so if they have more disposable income they are more likely to spend any new money.  

Keynes’ theory was all about getting people to spend – because when that happens demand rises, new jobs are created, even more people spend, and a fortuitous upward spiral is created.

The medicine Keynes developed was designed for a depression; for a period of falling inflation and employment, leading to low demand.  Depressions can occur when a downward spiral of pessimism sets in. In times of trouble people tend to save, this leads to less money being spent, demand falls, unemployment rises,  and people save even more.  Keynes’ ideas were designed to break this downward spiral.

The crisis of the 1970s was the opposite.  In fact, many would argue that the root cause of the 1970s period of stagflation was the Keynesian economic policy of previous governments.  Subsidies had made business inefficient, job creation schemes had meant labour was employed in areas that weren’t productive, and decades of policy designed to get demand up, had created inflationary pressures.

The surging rise in oil, caused by the Arab oil embargo, was just the catalyst – goes the argument.     Inflation only set in because the foundations for inflation were already in place.   Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan pursued policies which in many respects were the opposite of Keynesianism.  Chancellor Geoffrey Howe upped the rate of interest in the midst of recession, for example.

Alan Greenspan was worried about deflation – that is why he cut US interest rates to 1 per cent.     Maybe he was wrong, certainly many believe today’s credit crunch is down to him, creating an unsustainable credit boom.

Ben Bernanke probably knows more about the 1930s depression than anyone else alive.    As an academic he made his name on his studies into that period.  

But, which one is it today?    If it is 1970s type inflation, then now is not the time for cuts in interest rates.  As painful as it may be, we may need even need higher interest rates. 

But if it is 1930s, then the current inflation surge is just a one-off, governments and central banks should instead revisit the policy recommendations of Keynes.

Evidence has emerged over the last few days that the current crisis may be closer to the 1930s – and to find out why, read the next article.

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Is deflation the enemy within?

Beating inflation has been likened to squeezing toothpaste back into its tube.    The trouble is, because you can’t have negative interest rates, beating deflation is even harder – perhaps it is akin to squeezing toothpaste back into the tube, while at the same time you are standing on one leg, drinking a glass of milk and singing the national anthem backwards.

Policymakers must not let inflation get a hold again, but then again, neither must they let deflation get a toehold.

In classical economic theory, unemployment is not supposed to exist in the longer-term, or, as economists call it, equilibrium. If there is unemployment, then wages will keep falling so that demand for labour rises until unemployment reduces to zero. There are two problems with this theory.  Unemployment means low national income, which means low spending, which can lead to even higher unemployment.  If everyone was to take a cut in pay, the net effect on the economy will be lower consumer demand, and perhaps rising unemployment.

A classical economist will say, it just needs time.   Economic depressions sort themselves out, in the end.    They say, in the longer term there will be no unemployment.  By contrast, Keynes once said: “The long-term is a misleading guide to current affairs; in the long-term we are all dead.”

The second problem with this theory is based on the belief that equilibrium can never exist.    This is a theory that is currently being promoted by George Soros, but actually, the anti-equilibrium argument goes back decades.   It involves scientific concepts such as the second law of thermodynamics and entropy, but fascinating though this debate is, it is not relevant to today’s discussion.

It does seem to be true to say that the general thinking today would say this: 1930s-type depression requires tax cuts, lower interest rates and lots of money being pumped into the system by central banks.    A 1970s type stagflation requires painful tightening in monetary and fiscal policies – so that’s less government spending, more tax and higher interest rates.

Today, oil and food are shooting up in price – this suggests inflation. 

Today, asset prices, and house prices in particular, are crashing – not just in the UK, but in the US too, and in Spain.  This brings back memories of 1930s-type depressions.

The key to all this, though, surely rests with wage inflation

If wages rise in tandem with oil and food, then expect a rerun of the 1970s – inflation will soar.  

If unemployment rises, and wages fall, then expect the period of high raw material costs to end, expect demand for oil to plummet, and expect its price to fall, followed by falling prices elsewhere.    In short, expect deflation.

Now, browse the business pages of today’s newspapers and you won’t fail to notice that job losses are back on the agenda.  The Times headlined: “Major threat to building jobs as Persimmon closes new sites.”  The Guardian talked about 1,800 job losses at Norwich Union, and elsewhere headlined: “housebuilders begin to shore up unfinished properties and cut jobs.”   

Last week, a report from the Centre of Economics and Business Research (CEBR) predicted total job losses in the UK business services sector over the next two years of 40,000, the first reduction in the sector since 2001.   CEBR reckons people working for estate agents will be especially badly hit, with around 5 per cent losing their jobs.  

Meanwhile, analysts at JPMorgan Chase reckon 40,000 jobs will go in the City.

Actually, though, if you really want an idea of where we are going, look West.    Data from the US Labor Department revealed that US unemployment rose at its fastest rate in two years during May.  US unemployment is now 5.5 per cent, from 5 per cent.

So employment is falling a time of surging price of  oil.  Hence talk of 1970s-type stagflation.

But there is one big difference today.    In the UK, at least, unions do not have the power they used to have.     In the 1970s, pay cuts, even pay rises below inflation, were not considered acceptable.

But consider these words spoken by the GMB Union.    Martin Smith, from the GMB union told the BBC that his members were being asked to consider pay cuts of between 30 and 40 per cent.  “We’re also hearing on the grapevine from a number of our employers up and down the country that they’re also feeling the squeeze, and they want to start talking about pay cuts and other ways of saving money,” he said.

All of a sudden the question is being asked – will you accept a cut in pay in order to safeguard your job?  According to the BBC: “The Federation of Small Businesses says lower wages and longer hours may be the only way to prevent redundancies.”

Lower wages may prevent redundancies now, but the result could be a 1930s-type downwards spiral.  Pay cuts are the opposite of what Keynes would recommend.

At the end of 2006, we told of a report saying that in the US, corporate profits make up the higher percentage of GDP than at any time since 1929.    This suggests that businesses can afford to cut prices, by eating into profits.

The GMB warning is just that: a warning.     It may or may not prove to be a sign of things to come.

But, as you know, we are predicting that oil will, perhaps after rising this year, perhaps even after hitting $200, fall back eventually.   This could spell deflation.

It may be, just maybe, that inflation is not set to make a comeback at all.  That stagflation still sits in its grave, with a stake in its heart, and garlic infused in its coffin.      It may be that deflation is the real threat.

Policymakers need to watch this new pattern like a hawk.  But if pay cuts prove to be endemic, then they will need to immediately drop their hawk-like warning, and move into dove mode and slash rates. Fast.

At the same time, the government will have to drop its beloved fiscal rules – and borrow and spend – tax cuts in particular will be essential.

The time to act may not be now – but it may be soon.   

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